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Transmission of macro shocks to loan losses in a deep 
crisis: the case of Finland 
Bank of Finland Research 
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Building on the work of Sorge and Virolainen (2006), we revisit the data on 
aggregate Finnish bank loan losses from the corporate sector, which covers the 
‘Big Five’ crisis in Finland in the early 1990s. Several extensions to the empirical 
model are considered. These extensions are then used in the simulations of the 
aggregate loan loss distribution. The simulation results provide some guidance as 
to what might be the most important dimensions in which to improve the basic 
model. We found that making the average LGD depend on the business cycle 
seems to be the most important improvement. We also compare the empirical fit 
of the annual expected losses over a long period. In scenario-based analyses we 
find that a prolonged deep recession (as well as simultaneity of various macro 
shocks) has a convex effect on cumulative loan losses. This emphasizes the 
importance of an early policy response to a looming crisis. Finally, a comparison 
of the loan loss distribution on the eve of the 1990s crisis with the most recent 
distribution demonstrates the greatly elevated risk level prior to the 1990s crisis. 
 
Keywords: credit risk, bank loan losses, banking crisis, macro shocks, default 
rates, stress testing 
 
JEL classification numbers: C15, E37, G01, G21, G32, G33  
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Makrotaloudellisten sokkien vaikutus luottotappioihin 
kriisien aikana 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 26/2009 
Esa Jokivuolle – Matti Viren – Oskari Vähämaa 




Tässä tutkimuksessa mallinnetaan kokonaisluottotappioita, joita on aiheutunut 
suomalaisille pankeille yritysluotoista erityisesti Suomen suuren laman aikana 
1990-luvun alussa. Työ perustuu Sorgen ja Virolaisen (2006) malliin, jota laajen-
netaan eri tavoin. Laajennetulla mallilla tehdään simulaatioita kokonaisluotto-
tappioista. Simulointitulosten perusteella voidaan tehdä alustavia päätelmiä siitä, 
mihin suuntaan alkuperäistä mallia olisi hyödyllisintä kehittää. Tulosten perusteel-
la keskimääräisen tappio-osuuden (LGD) määräytyminen suhdannevaiheen mu-
kaan on mallin tärkein kehityspiirre. Työssä tarkastellaan myös luottotappiomallin 
historiallista selityskykyä. Skenaarioanalyysi paljastaa, että pitkittynyt syvä taan-
tuma tai useiden makrotaloudellisten sokkien samanaikaisuus vaikuttaa kumulatii-
visiin luottotappioihin kiihdyttävästi. Tämä tulos tähdentää, että uhkaavaan krii-
siin on puututtava riittävän ajoissa. Lopuksi verrataan pankkisektorin kokonais-
luottotappioiden vuoden 2007 lopun todennäköisyysjakaumaa siihen todennä-
köisyysjakaumaan, joka edelsi 1990-luvun alun kriisiä. Vertailu osoittaa, että 
luottoriskit olivat kasvaneet huomattavasti ennen 1990-luvun alun kriisiä. 
 
Avainsanat: luottoriski, pankkien luottotappiot, pankkikriisi, makrotaloudelliset 
sokit, konkurssiaste, stressitestaus 
 
JEL-luokittelu: C15, E37, G01, G21, G32, G33  
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Understanding the sources of corporate credit losses continue to lie at the heart of 
commercial banks’ risk management as well as macro-prudential analysis 
conducted by financial authorities, both now and in the future. In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of 2007–2008, worldwide weakened economic growth 
prospects threaten to increase corporate defaults and credit losses which may 
further burden the already troubled banking sector and impair their lending ability. 
  In analyzing the link between macro economy and corporate credit losses it is 
useful to look at earlier historic episodes when credit losses have amounted. A 
recent case in point is the Finnish banking crisis and great depression in the early 
1990’s, which have been analyzed by eg Conesa, Kehoe and Ruhl (2007), 
Gorodnichenko et al (2009) and Honkapohja et al (2009). The size of the Finnish 
crisis was exceptional even by international standards (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). The share of non-performing loans went up 13 per cent and annual default 
rates rose to 3 per cent which resulted in high loan losses (see Figures 1.1 and 
1.2). The crisis cost the Finnish government almost 13 per cent of a one year GDP 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Since the depression, economic development has 
been very favourable and annual default rates have come down to less than one 
per cent so that loan losses have been almost nonexistent.
1 
  Some interesting observations as regards the relationship between defaults 
and loan losses can be made just by visual inspection of the Finnish evidence. In 
particular, the defaults-loan losses relationship appears at least to some extent to 
be nonlinear (cf. Figure 1.2). Even in good times there are quite many business 
failures; in the Finnish data, the annual default rate has not gone below 0.8 per 
cent, but they do not seem to have caused much loan losses. There are probably 
several reasons for this regularity. First, some fraction of new firms will always 
fail, eg, because of entrepreneurial incompetence or initial lack of resources or 
demand. Most of such firms are ‘fortunately’ small so that the effect on banks’ 
loan losses is limited. The second reason is probably related to collateral values. 
In good times loan-to-value ratios are reasonably low and thus most losses can be 
covered by collateral. In deep recessions things are different: also some very big 
firms fail and falling market values of collateral reinforce the negative impact.
2 
Thus loan losses tend to be severe only in deep recessions or depressions. That is 
why we also in this paper wish to further analyze the behaviour of corporate credit 
losses in deep and long-lasting recessions and depressions. 
 
                                                 
1 For more details of the Finnish banking sector loan losses and comparisons with other Nordic 
countries, see Pesola (2001). 
2 That LGD tends to increase in recessions is empirically rather well established; see eg 
Schuermann (2004) and the references cited therein.  
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      Agr = agriculture, Man = manufacturing, 
Con = construction, Trd = Trade, Trns = transportation, and 
Oth = Others 
 
 
Figure 1.2  Relationship between loan losses and the aggregate 





















     The  (seasonally-adjusted)  default rate corresponds to the 
whole economy. Loan losses are interpolated from an 




Our work follows the branch of literature that has focused on the transmission of 
macro shocks, notably output, real interest rate and aggregate corporate 
indebtedness, to corporate failures and banks loan losses. We adopt the 
framework of Sorge and Virolainen (2006) which first models industry-specific 
corporate default rates with the macro variables and then simulates loan losses by 
using the industry-specific default rates as proxies for corporate probabilities of 
default (PD) in the respective industries and by assuming a constant loss given 
default (LGD) across all companies. Our aim is to extend their analysis of the 
Finnish case in several ways. First, we consider the following extensions to their 
model. 1) We allow LGD to depend on the state of the business cycle. 2) We 
consider industry-specific output shocks instead of the aggregate shock. We also 
take a step back and make a basic comparison by running a single-equation model 
for the aggregate corporate default rate, in order to investigate the importance of 
disaggregating to the industry-specific default rates in the first place. 3) We try an 
alternative times-series specification of the macro shocks. As Sorge and 
Virolainen (2006), we then perform Monte Carlo simulations of the macro based 
loan loss model to produce loan loss distributions. We investigate how the model 
extensions 1) to 3) affect these distributions. Taken together, these results 
constitute a set of robustness checks to the basic model of Sorge and Virolainen 
(2006), which may provide some guidance as to what may be the most crucial 
areas of ‘model risk’ in the basic model. The most important result here concerns 
the LGD, endogenous to the business cycle state, which we measure as the annual 
average of the entire corporate sector and which we are able to estimate by using 
aggregate data on the number of defaults, loan losses and the distribution of 
corporate debt within the corporate sector. 
  Second, we extend loan loss scenario analyses to further study the effects of a 
deep prolonged recession. Interestingly, it appears that a constant GDP shock that 
persists over several years has a slightly convex effect on cumulative loan losses. 
This nonlinear effect is further reinforced when we add a simplistic feedback 
mechanism from loan losses to the GDP growth. We also demonstrate a nonlinear 
effect from macro shocks to loan losses in that different simultaneous shocks 
seem to be reinforcing one another’s effect on loan losses vis-á-vis an individual 
macro shock of commensurate size. Third, we simulate the impact on potential 
aggregate loan losses of a single industrial cluster, for which Finland also 
provides an interesting case as a result of the central role in its economy of the 
newly developed ICT cluster. Fourth, we complement the analysis of Sorge and 
Virolainen (2006) by providing the fit of the macro based model of loan losses to 
the actual loan losses experienced in Finland especially during the crisis years of 
the early 1990’s. We find that although the endogenous LGD seems an important 
improvement to the fit relative to the basic model with a constant LGD, the model 
still falls short of capturing the full magnitude of loan losses experienced in 
Finland during the 90’s crisis. We discuss potential explanations for the remaining  
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gap. Lastly, we compute the loan loss distribution both for a pre-90’s crisis period 
and the most recent period in our data. This comparison clearly shows the very 
significant impact that the prevailing macro state has on the conditional loan loss 
distribution. It is remarkable that in 1990 expected aggregate loan losses in 
Finland were roughly double what they were in the third quarter of 2008. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the industry-
specific default rate model estimation and section 3 discusses the estimation 
results. In section 4 we simulate the loan loss distribution and consider the effects 
on the loss distribution of the various extensions to the basic model. Further, we 
investigate a scenario of a prolonged deep recession and a scenario of 
simultaneous shocks. We also provide the empirical fit of the model based 
expected loan losses in Finland over the sample period. Finally, we contrast the 
pre-1990’s crisis loan loss distribution with the one simulated with the most recent 
data. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Estimation  procedure 
The estimated model of industry-specific default rates is in essence the same as 
Sorge and Virolainen (2006). It is only that we now allow for industry-specific 
output (output gap or output growth rate) to affect the corresponding industry-
specific default rate and use industry-specific real interest rates which reflect 
industry-specific inflation rates. The level of indebtedness is also industry-
specific. Thus, the estimated equation is of the following form 
 
it it 3 it 2 it 1 0 it u l r y d + β + β + β + β =  (2.1) 
 
where di denotes the default rate in industry i (agriculture, construction, 
manufacturing, trade, transportation and other services), y private sector output 
(henceforth output, for simplicity), r the real interest rate and l the indebtedness 
level. The estimation period is 1987Q1–2007Q4. Estimation results for (2.1) for 
different output variables are reported in Table 2.1. In Figure 2.1 we compare the 
single-equation and the system form (SUR) estimation results in the case of the 
basic specification where output gap is the output variable. In Table 2.2, we report 
diagnostic test results for this basic specification. 
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Figure 2.1  Comparison of OLS and SUR estimates 
      of output gap for different sectors 
 
Comparison of OLS and SUR estimates for b1












The default rate model (2.1) provides us with the basis for evaluating the impact 
of macroeconomic shocks on corporate defaults and further on banks’ loan losses. 
To obtain empirical counterparts for the macro shocks we use alternative 
specifications. To begin with, we follow Sorge and Virolainen (2006) and 
estimate an AR(2) process for y, r and l to filter out the shocks as the residuals of 
the AR(2)s. Alternatively, we use a simple random walk representation for the 
time series of these variables. On the basis of the estimated shocks we can 
compute the variance-covariance matrix of the macroeconomic shocks that is 
needed in sampling defaults and thus loan losses from the firm level micro data. 
  In order to carry out the sampling procedure properly; that is, to ensure that 
default rates are between 0 and 1, a logistic transformation is needed for the 
default rate p = (1/(1+exp(d)) in estimating and simulating the model (see Sorge 
and Virolainen, 2006). These values can then be conveniently transformed to 
original default rates by using the log transformation d = ln((1-p)/p). 
  When using Monte-Carlo methods in simulating the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on loan losses we use the assumption that all random 
elements are normally distributed. The expected values of the macroeconomic 
shocks are assumed to be zero in the basic scenarios. When dealing with the 
depression scenarios in section 4.2, however, we change this assumption by 
introducing systematically negative values for output growth or, correspondingly, 
more positive values for real interest rates and aggregate corporate indebtedness. 
  In the Monte-Carlo simulation, the first step was a Cholesky transformation of 
the variance-covariance matrix of the stochastic terms. Although correlations  
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between these terms were not overly high ordering of variables (shocks) turned 
out to be important (see section 4.3). 
 
Table 2.1  Estimation results of the basic default rate model 
      for the various industries as well as for 
     all  industries 
 
 Agr  Man  Con  Trd  Trns  Oth  Tot 
Constant  0,002 0,000 0,003 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,000 
t-value  (4.05)  (0.31)  (16.87) (4.78)  (11.59) (0.90)  (0.94) 
total output gap  -0,008  -0,043  -0,015 -0,034 -0,011 -0,004 -0,032 
t-value  (2.99) (6.91) (3.61) (6.05) (3.41) (0.55) (6.07) 
Interest  rate  (real)  0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 
t-value  (0.16) (0.20) (1.16) (1.41) (0.26) (10.71)  (0.47) 
Debt  -0,025 0,210 0,099 0,141 0,005 0,096 0,235 




(0.320) (0.973) (9.668) 
R2  0,121 0,891 0,856 0,929 0,175 0,809 0,873 
SEE  0,425 1,082 0,670 0,781 0,533 1,092 0,789 
DW  2,020 1,308 1,451 1,141 1,497 0,982 0,495 
         
Constant  0,002 0,000 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,001 .. 

















t-value  (0.01) (5.09) (2.60) (9.42) (3.92) (0.35)  .. 
Interest  rate  (real)  0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 .. 
t-value  (0.71) (0.48) (2.56) (0.76) (0.15) (10.92) .. 
Debt  -0,014 0,209 0,097 0,119 0,006 0,098 .. 
t-value (1.05)  (18.35)  (12.06)  (13.31)  (0.30)  (0.99)  .. 
R2  0,017 0,878 0,844 0,882 0,185 0,808 .. 
SEE  0,446 1,152 0,696 0,975 0,562 1,093 .. 
DW  1,816 0,999 1,315 0,828 1,395 0,997 .. 
         
Constant  0,002 0,001 0,003 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,000 
t-value  (3.11) (1.34) (13.80)  (1.79) (6.72) (1.24) (0.32) 
















t-value  (0.45) (2.92) (2.75) (1.33) (0.11) (0.91) (1.30) 
Interest  rate  (real)  0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 
t-value  (0.40) (0.16) (0.22) (0.33) (0.25) (11.72)  (0.48) 
Debt  -0,014 0,194 0,100 0,167 0,007 0,040 0,214 
t-value  (1.11) (12.89)  (13.35)  (14.82)  (0.28) (0.34) (6.38) 
R2  0,020 0,851 0,846 0,893 0,009 0,810 0,719 
SEE  0,446 1,273 0,692 0,961 0,620 1,088 1,158 
DW  1,821 0,910 1,304 0,819 1,093 1,025 0,222 
Agr = agriculture, Man = manufacturing, Con = construction, Trd = Trade, Trns = transportation, 
Oth = Others, and Tot = All industries. 
When testing the coefficient restriction that the coefficients are equal for all sectors, the F statistics 
turns out to be 6,03 which is significant at all conventional significance levels. When comparing, 




Table 2.2  Diagnostic tests 
 
 




































































Prob (0.228)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.000) (0.433) (0.498) (0.029) 
White  1,548 2,130 1,472 4,035 0,509 2,071 2,286 
Prob  (0.220) (0.039) (0.177) (0.000) (0.862) (0.045) (0.027) 
Chow  test  (1999Q1) 0,444 2,920 2,159 4,769 6,834  13,344  14,062 
Prob  (0.643) (0.027) (0.083) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Quandt-Andrews  test  1,007 5,650 3,165 5,548 6,090 9,743  17,140 
Prob  (0.778) (0.165) (0.613) (0.176) (0.126) (0.011) (0.000) 
















Prob  (0.145) (0.967) (0.259) (0.775) (0.454) (0.018) (0.001) 
Ramsey  RESET  test 1,380 2,855 3,335 2,023 5,911 4,667 3,320 
Prob  (0.258) (0.064) (0.041) (0.141) (0.004) (0.013) (0.042) 
CUSUM  + + + + + – – 
CUSUM^2  + – + – + – – 
Recursive coefficient 
of  GDP  + + + + + – + 
Agr = agriculture, Man = manufacturing, Con = construction, Trd = Trade, Trns = transportation, 
Oth = Others, and Tot = All industries. 
Cusum (+) means that the assumption of coefficient stability cannot be rejected. Accordingly, 
recursive coefficient (+) means that the coefficient of output gaps seems to be stable over time. 
 
 
3 Estimation  results 
In this section we comment on our estimation results presented in Table 2.1. To 
start with, the model fits the data on industry-specific default rates reasonably 
well. Only in the case of agriculture, and to some extent, other services, there are 
some problems. Thus, in the case of default rates in agriculture we are not able to 
obtain coefficients of the correct sign for the real interest rate and indebtedness. 
We suspect that this failure reflects some data problems: it is quite difficult to 
distinguish family (household) farming and firm-type farming.
3 ‘Other industries’ 
is also a bit difficult because it really represent a mix of various activities. It is 
thus no big surprise to us that the main diagnostic problems, related to stability, 
                                                 
3 For the simulation analysis, we changed the equation for agriculture by setting the coefficients of 
incorrect signs equal to zero and re-estimating the equations with this/these restriction(s).  
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appear in this sector. Even so, the coefficient estimates make sense as well as the 
simulation results in the next section. 
  Interestingly, one may notice that the data quite strongly favours the 
disaggregated model. When we just focus on the aggregate default rate model 
(titled ‘TOT’ in the last column of Table 2.1) and use the corresponding aggregate 
equation several diagnostic problems arise. In particular, the stability properties of 
the aggregate equation seem dubious (see Table 2.2). Moreover, the explanatory 
power seems to suffer from aggregation, though not dramatically. 
  One may go deeper in the disaggregated structure by using industry-specific 
output instead of aggregate output in explaining each industry-specific default rate 
(the second block in Table 2.1) but it appears that the gain is not significant (in 
either direction). This notion is confirmed when we carry out the loan-loss 
simulations in the next session and see that essentially the same results are 
obtained for both aggregate output and industry-specific output. Obviously, 
industry-specific output model is required when we want to examine the role of 
sector-specific shocks (see section 4.3). Finally, we may note that the output 
measure of the basic specification, the Hodrick-Prescott measure of output gap, 
performs much better than just the output growth. Hence, we hold to this measure. 
  The models are first estimated with basic OLS which may be subject to 
certain well-known pitfalls. First of all, the right-hand side variables may depend 
on the default rates creating a classical simultaneity problem. The problem is 
particularly relevant for output, not so much for interest rates or indebtedness 
because these variables have been lagged in the final estimation specification. As 
for output, corporate failures probably affect output by destroying productive 
capacity and firm-specific human capital. The bias is probably smaller when we 
use aggregate output instead of industry-specific output but it is hard to say more 
on the magnitude of this bias without proper instruments. In one of our loan loss 
simulations, we allow for a simple feedback mechanism, meant to capture the 
effect of defaults on output. Another problem with OLS estimation is related to 
correlation of residuals of equations for different industries. To see the effect, we 
have used the more efficient SUR estimator instead of OLS (see Figure 2.1). 
Overall, differences in the estimated coefficients do not appear to be very big so 
that we may as well use the OLS estimated coefficients in the simulation exercise 
of section 4. This choice is also supported by the notion that the data for 
agriculture may contain some deficiencies that could in the SUR estimation 
contaminate parameter estimates of other sectors’ equations. The important 
message of Figure 2.1 is perhaps not the fact that the two estimators produce 
similar estimates but the fact that the coefficients for different sectors are indeed 
very different and hence it seems necessary to have a disaggregated model when 
evaluating loan loss risks with simulations. 
  To sum up results from diagnostic tests, it seems that the basic model for 
industry-specific default rates passes muster rather well. In particular, we may  
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notice that the stability properties of the equations are rather good in spite of the 
huge changes in the default rates which have taken place in the early 1990’s. This 
also shows up in recursive estimates of the coefficient of the output gap, although 




3.1 On  estimating  the endogenous LGD 
It is well known that LGD is not a constant across defaulted loans, and that LGD 
tends to increase in economic downturns (see eg Schuermann, 2004, and the 
literature surveyed therein). We therefore relax the assumption of the basic model 
of a constant LGD and replace it with a time-varying annual LGD which is a 
function of the state of the business cycle, measured with output gap. In other 
words, we assume that the LGD is the same for all defaulted loans in a given year, 
but it can vary from year to year according to the business cycle. If the expected 
annual LGD equals the constant LGD of the basic model, then we should expect a 
fatter tail to the loan loss distribution, given that both PDs and the annual LGD are 
decreasing functions of the output gap. 
  Because we do not have data from Finland on individual loans’ loss given 
default, we have estimated the annual average LGD from aggregate data by using 
a method based on random sampling. We make use of the following equality in 
















t , i i t
N
1 i
t t , i i
N
1 t , i i t
N
1 t t , i i t
l D LGD
LGD l D l D LGD
LGD l D losses loan Total
 (3.1) 
 
where D equals one if firm i is in default, zero otherwise, and where l denotes the 
amount of firm i’s loans. N is the total number of firms. In other words, total loan 
losses in year t simply equal the sum of loans of bankrupt firms in that year, 
multiplied by the common LGD in that year. We have data on annual total loan 
losses, the number of defaulted companies in each year and the loan size 
distribution across companies. In order to estimate the LGDt for each year, we 
                                                 
4 This result seems to be in striking contrast with some preliminary estimation results with the 
model for aggregate loan losses. Thus, if loan losses are explained by the aggregate default rate (d) 
the explanatory power is reasonably high (0.93) but the RESET test clearly suggests that the 
functional form is mis-specified (F(2,76)  = 43.54). The relationship seems to be very strongly 
nonlinear which also shows up in the fact that if the second and third powers of d are introduced as 
additional explanatory variables the R
2 goes up to 0.97.  
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draw random samples of size kt out of the annual population of Nt firms such that 
kt is the number of defaulted firms in that year. For each round of sampling, the 
LGDt which equates (3.1) is computed. After a sufficient number of random 
samples, we obtain a distribution of LGDts. The mean of this distribution is then 
used as our final estimate of the LGDt. To our knowledge, this type of method has 
not been previously used in empirical studies on LGD and it might be interesting 
to explore it further in future work.
5 
  Figure 3.1 depicts the estimated ‘actual’ annual LGD series against the output 
gap, and provides in the legend the results of regressing the ‘actual’ LGD on the 
output gap. This model is then used to endogenize the LGD in our loan loss 
simulations. We find that during the sample period the annual estimated LGD 
ranges between 12% (in 2006) and 73% (in 1991), the average being 47%, which 
is well in line with, say, the 45% reference point used in Basel II. 
 
Figure 3.1  The estimated annual average LGD (‘Actual’ 
      LGD) against the output gap. The regression of the 
      ‘Actual’ LGD on the output gap obtains the 
      following parameter estimates: ‘Actual’ 
     LGDt = 0.43 – 2.03*Output gapt. The significance 
      level of the coefficient on the Output gap is 0.044% 


















                                                 
5 Further details of the LGD estimation procedure are available from the authors upon request.  
17 
4 Simulation  results 
As Sorge and Virolainen (2006) describe, the macro based empirical model for 
industry-specific default rates can be used to simulate loan losses. Here we give 
just a brief account of the procedure and refer the reader to Sorge and Virolainen 
(2006) for further details. We take a representative bank loan portfolio of the 
Finnish corporate sector and group the included companies according to their 
industry. In the absence of firm-specific balance sheet data, each company in each 
period of the simulation is then assigned the default rate of its industry, obtained 
from the default rate model. An independent binary random draw is then carried 
out for each company to determine whether it survives or defaults in a given 
simulation period. If a company defaults, a share of its outstanding credit, 
determined by the LGD, either constant or endogenous, is taken as a loss. The 
multi-period simulation procedure keeps track of defaulted firms in the portfolio 
so that each company can only default once during the simulation horizon. 
Individual firms’ credit losses are then summed to obtain the aggregate 
cumulative bank loan losses of the corporate sector at the end of the simulation 
horizon. 
  As to the representative bank loan portfolio of the Finnish corporate sector, 
Sorge and Virolainen (2006) used data of the 3000 biggest Finnish companies 
from the year 2002.
6 Together these companies accounted for more than 90 per 
cent of the total loans granted by MFIs (henceforth banks, for brevity) to the 
corporate sector that year. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to us, due to its 
non-public status, to update or extend further back into the history the portfolio 
data used in Sorge and Virolainen (2006). However, we have had access to a more 
limited data source of the 500 biggest companies in Finland which, on the other 
hand, does not provide the division of corporate credit into bank loans and other 
credit.
7 Simulation experiments with this alternative data set indicated that 
changes in the loan size distribution across companies have only minor effects on 
the resulting loan loss distributions in our modelling framework. Therefore, our 
final choice was to use the portfolio composition in Sorge and Virolainen (2006) 
as the representative corporate loan portfolio throughout the entire sample period. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Data also includes some information from 2003. 
7 The data source is Talouselämä 500.  
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4.1  Loan loss distributions with extensions to the basic 
model 
Our first set of simulation results compares the basic model of Sorge and 
Virolainen (2006) with the various extensions we have considered: 1) the 
endogenous LGD, 2) industry-specific output shocks, and 3) two alternative shock 
specifications; the standard AR(2) case used by Sorge and Virolainen (2006) and 
a random walk. These extensions are grouped in Table 4.1 in the following way. 
The two alternative shock specifications (cases a and c) and the case of industry-
specific shocks (b) are each run with both a constant and an endogenous LGD. 
Hence a total of six cases are considered. The case with the aggregate output 
shock, modelled with AR(2), and constant LGD, corresponds to the case 
considered by Sorge and Virolainen (2006). In each case we have computed three 
descriptive statistics of the simulated loan loss distribution three years ahead, 
starting at the beginning of 2008: the expected loss and the unexpected loss at 
both 99 and 99.9 per cent confidence (or ‘value-at-risk’) level. The expected 
endogenous LGD is always adjusted (approximately) to the same level as the 
constant LGD so that the most interesting case of how endogenous LGD affects 
the ‘tail’ of the loan loss distribution can be considered. The number of simulation 
rounds in each case is fifty thousand (50 000).
8 
 
                                                 
8 This may still leave room for some inaccuracy stemming from the finite number of simulation 
rounds so that some caution is in order when interpreting particularly the unexpected loss figures 
at the far end of the loan loss distribution.  
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Table 4.1  Summary of simulations 
 









a) Aggregate output 
    
AR(2)    LGD = 0.43  1.72  2.56  3.69 
   LGD  endogenous 
LGD min/mean/max = 
 0.26/ 0.43/ 0.59 
1.74 2.69  3.97 
 
b) Industry-specific output 
    
AR(2)     LGD = 0.43  1.73  2.56  3.73 
   LGD  endogenous 
LGD min/mean/max = 
 0.25/ 0.43/ 0.60 
1.75 2.67  3.91 
 
c) Aggregate output  
    
RW   LGD=0.43  1.59  2.51  3.78 
   LGD  endogenous   
LGD min/mean/max = 
0.18/ 0.43/ 0.70 
1.61 2.67  3.85 
In a) the (weighted) aggregate PD is 0.0033, in b) 0.0034 and in c) 0.0031. Simulation 
horizon is 3 years starting at the beginning of 2008. 
 
 
When examining the results in Table 4.1 we first note that, overall, differences in 
magnitude between the various cases are not very big. However, as expected, the 
endogenous LGD clearly has an effect of widening the loan loss distribution. This 
is manifested as higher unexpected losses. In the base case model (a) with 
aggregate output and AR(2) shocks, the endogenous LGD increases the 99% and 
the 99.9% unexpected losses by 5–8%. Similarly, in cases (b) and (c) the 
endogenous LGD increases the unexpected losses. One reason that the effect of 
the endogenous LGD is not very big is that the explanatory power of the LGD-
output regression model is ‘only’ 22% (see Figure 3.1). In actuality, further 
experiments with the LGD-model revealed that a much higher coefficient on 
output and thus a much higher explanatory power is achieved if we use the first 
lead of the output as the explanatory variable. Such a lead structure may be 
understood as resulting from, say, certain loan loss accounting conventions but it 
is problematic to implement in the loan loss simulation model. Therefore we have 
held to the original LGD-output specification in the simulations. However, should 
one want to experiment with loan loss simulations using the higher coefficient on 
output in the LGD model, the resulting widening of the loan loss distribution 
would naturally be more pronounced.  
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  When we make a comparison across the cases (a), (b) and (c), either with the 
constant LGD or the endogenous LGD, we see that the unexpected losses stay 
roughly at the same level for the different model versions. The highest 99.9% 
unexpected loss (the unexpected loss being 3.97% of the loan stock) is obtained 
for the base case model (a) with endogenous LGD. One may conclude from these 
results that it seems to matter less whether we use industry-specific or aggregate 
output shocks or how the shock processes are specified. What does matter is that 
we replace the constant LGD with the endogenous LGD.We also investigated the 
effect on the loan loss distribution of increasing the standard deviation of a shock 
(in this case the output shock). As we expected, unexpected losses increased 
correspondingly in a roughly linear manner. 
 
 
4.2 Prolonged  recession  and simultaneous shocks 
After the analysis of unconditional loan loss distributions we wish to study the 
impact on loan losses of a prolonged deep recession. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
results of this exercise. The main message is that, if a constant negative shock to 
output persists over several periods (up to 5 years), the cumulative impact on 
expected loan losses is significantly convex. Roughly speaking, if cumulative 
expected losses are 1% of the loan stock at the end of the first year, they are more 
than 10% at the end of the fifth year, while a linear extrapolation would suggest 
cumulative expected losses of 5% (see Figure 4.2). Figure 4.2 further compares 
the base case with a case in which we have added a simplistic feedback 
mechanism from defaults to output; GDP is decreased at a constant quarterly rate 
which is thought to correspond to the loss of productive capacity of the corporate 
sector as a result of cumulating defaults. Clearly, the convex impact on the 
expected losses of the prolonged recession is reinforced. The convex effect is 
probably at least partially the result of the fact that the indebtedness increases as 
output decreases because output affects directly the denominator in the 
indebtedness variable. The policy implication of these simulation results would 
appear to be that long-lasting shocks causing an economic downturn should be 
dealt with at an early stage before they develop into prolonged recession. 
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Figure 4.1  Distribution of loan losses (fixed LGD) 
 
























Figure 4.2  Expected losses and the length of depression: 
      feedback from defaults to output 
 
 
Feedback means here that GDP is decreased at a constant quarterly rate which is thought 





In Figure 4.3 we illustrate another important effect related to simultaneity of 
shocks. In other words, the question is whether it makes a difference whether 
shocks that are known to increase loan losses take place simultaneously or 
whether they happen one at a time. In order to study this question in a meaningful 
manner we have first chosen shocks to output, real interest rate and the corporate 
sector indebtedness in such a way that each individual shock alone would produce 
an equal size increase in the weighted average of the industry-specific PDs. We 
then make the following comparison. We run our basic model of loan losses 
separately with each individual shock and take the sum over the three model runs 
of the increase in the aggregate expected loan loss. This sum of expected losses is 
then compared to a single run of the basic model in which all the three previous 
shocks take place simultaneously. This comparison is depicted in Figure 4.3 for 
three different shock sizes, corresponding to a 10, 50 and 100 per cent increase in 
the PD. Clearly the combined effect is much larger. This result obviously reflects 
the correlations between individual shocks. This analysis may also provide one 
way to better understand what happened in the Finnish crisis of the early 1990’s 
and how the situation is different from today’s perspective. In the early 90’s, 
clearly a combination of shocks hit Finland: output dropped as a result of a big 
export shock, effective indebtedness increased dramatically as a result of the 
devaluation of the currency, and interest rates sky-rocketed. In contrast, today’s 
conditions seem essentially less severe as corporate indebtedness remains 
moderate and interest rates are low, making the Finnish banking sector better 
prepared to weather the negative export demand shock resulting from the 2007–
2008 global crisis. 
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Figure 4.3  Comparison of effects of macro shocks 
 
 
Sum of individual shocks denotes the sum of differences between the simulated values 
and the base in terms of the expected losses due to the three macro shocks (of equal size 
in terms of the PD). Combination of shocks denotes the analogous difference in expected 
loss due to a simultaneous occurance of these three macro shocks (all of equal size). 
 
 
4.3  Effect on loan loss risk of an industrial cluster 
When assessing the risk of aggregate loan losses in an economy, we also like to 
draw attention to the fact that particularly in many small economies single 
industrial clusters or even individual companies can make a sizeable portion of 
total output. Finland is a good example of such a situation as the ICT and forestry-
related industrial clusters are central to the economy. If such clusters which 
operate globally make decisions to move their production to other countries, it is 
in principal possible to have large output effects within a relatively short time 
period. Although such moves in themselves would not necessarily induce any 
credit risks to materialize, the second-round effect via overall decline in output 
could entail increasing loan losses as our empirical model would suggest. 
  For the purpose of loan loss scenario analysis it may be wise to consider such 
shifts in production and output as separate risk events because the probability of 
such events may not be properly captured on the basis of historical output 
fluctuations. In the following we consider the effect on loan losses that a single 
industrial cluster, the ICT cluster in Finland, could have. To this end, the version  
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of our empirical model with industry-specific output, discussed in section 4.1, is 
quite useful. We first assess how the ICT cluster affects output in the respective 
industry (manufacturing). The shock then spreads to other industries, having an 
effect on their respective outputs, through the model’s shock correlation structure. 
For simplicity, we consider an extreme scenario of the Finnish economy with an 
exit of the ICT cluster. Because the ICT cluster makes up ca. 22% of the 
manufacturing industry in Finland, we consider a 22% cumulative negative output 
shock to the manufacturing industry that would take place over the three-year 
horizon; our standard simulation horizon in this study.
9 Such a shock turns out to 
have the largest spillover effect on output in construction and trade industries as 
well as in agriculture and other services industry in each of which output falls by 
about 7%. The effect on aggregate loan loss distribution is that the expected loss 
is 3.22% while the 99% and 99.9% unexpected losses are at 4.01% and 5.85%, 
respectively. As we have used the model version with endogenous LGD, these 
numbers should be compared, respectively, to 1.75%, 2.67% and 3.91% from 
Table 4.1, section b), second line. Thus the ICT cluster shock almost doubles the 
expected aggregate loan losses relative to the unconditional expected losses. The 
size of the effect on loan losses suggests that the type of approach to stress testing 
taken in this subsection may be important. Lastly, as already discussed in section 
2, when modeling an output shock which originates from a certain industry and 
then spills over to the rest of the economy, this has to be taken into account by 
setting the original shock as the first one in the matrix of the Cholesky 
decomposition. Our experiments showed that ignoring the proper order of shocks 
may greatly bias the results downwards. 
 
 
4.4  Empirical fit of the loan loss model 
Because the Finnish loan loss experience of the first half of the 1990’s is so extra-
ordinary, it is very tempting to try to get at least a rough idea of how well the 
current macro based model could capture that episode. As already discussed in the 
beginning of this section we effectively assume that the individual loan size 
distribution of the aggregate bank loan portfolio has stayed invariant. 
  The results are depicted in Figure 4.4. Although the model can follow the 
overall profile of the aggregate loan losses, it exaggerates loan losses in normal 
times and falls greatly short of them in the 1990’s crisis years. This was partly to 
be expected: although our default rates model fits quite well to actual default rates 
(cf. the high R
2s mostly in the range of 80% to 90% in Table 2.1), the fluctuations 
in the aggregate loan losses are larger than in the aggregate default rate, as shown 
                                                 
9 For an alternative way of quantifying the output contribution of the Finnish ICT cluster, see Ali-
Yrkkö et al (2000).  
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in Figure 1.2. The endogenous LGD explains part of the gap, as expected, but not 
much in relation to the size of the gap. One possible explanation for the remaining 
gap is that the effects of the large devaluation of the Finnish currency during the 
crisis are not fully controlled for in the calculation of loan losses. Namely, a 
number of non-exporting companies had taken foreign currency denominated 
loans from Finnish banks (cf. the recent experience in Iceland). As a result of the 
devaluation the nominal value of these loans rose in terms of the domestic 
currency. Unfortunately we do not have sufficiently disaggregated data to control 
for these effects. A second potential explanation is that during the Finnish crisis, 
many big export-oriented companies went bankrupt. Obviously, their relative 
weight is not sufficiently reflected in the industry-specific default rates we have 
used. For instance, given that the almost over-night collapse of trade with the 
Soviet Union was a central reason for the Finnish crisis (see eg Gorodnichenko et 
al, 2009), we should have data on firm-level exposures to the Soviet trade to have 
a more disaggregated model of defaults and hence to better capture the actual loan 
loss behaviour. Clearly, back then the collapse of the Soviet Union was a big 
unexpected event and, with hindsight, a big single risk factor to the Finnish 
economy. In the same vein as we argued in section 4.3, macro based credit risk 
models might benefit from trying to incorporate single risk factors related to 
single institutions, markets or products which form a sizable part of the economy 
and which are vulnerable to discrete events that might dramatically change their 
role in the economy. 
 
Figure 4.4  Fit of the constant LGD and the endogenous LGD 





4.5  Loan loss distribution: 2008 vs pre-1990’s crisis 
Finally, it is tempting to make a comparison between the loan loss risk outlook 
prior to the Finnish crisis in the early 1990’s and today. Again, we simply use the 
sample portfolio from 2002 as a proxy for the portfolio prevailing prior to the 
1990’s crisis. 
  In particular, we considered the state of the banking sector at the end of 1989 
and took the starting values for the macro variables from the first and the second 
quarter of 1990. With the basic constant LGD version of the model, the expected 
loss and the 99% and 99.9% unexpected loss, respectively, were 3.65, 3.53 and 
4.95. These results can then be compared with the more recent situationas of the 
end of 2007. In Table 4.1, the corresponding numbers are 1.72, 2.53 and 3.58. In 
terms of the expected loss, we can see that the aggregate loan loss risk was more 
than two times bigger just before the 1990’s crisis hit than it was at the end of 
2007. The difference in risks is effectively a result of the different macroeconomic 
position then and now. Particularly the indebtedness of the corporate sector in 
Finland was much higher on the eve of the 1990’s crisis than it is now. Total 
corporate sector indebtedness in the second quarter of 1990 was almost double 
and the indebtedness of the manufacturing industry alone was almost three-times 
the respective indebtedness in the second quarter of 2008. In general, these results 
emphasize the role played by the prevailing macroeconomic conditions in 
assessing risks of future loan losses. 
  It is tempting to speculate with what might have been done differently, had 
the awareness of the size of the aggregate credit risk been better at the end of the 
1980’s. Clearly, knowledge and use of the current type of credit risk portfolio 
models started their international proliferation only in the latter half of the 1990’s. 
Of course, the crisis of the 2007–2008 has revealed severe inadequacies also in 
the current credit risk models. Nevertheless, the comparison for Finland that we 
have carried out here by using the current modeling framework is justified on the 
basis that for Finland the current crisis came almost entirely as an external 
(export-driven) shock. The Finnish banking sector was not much affected by the 




5 Concluding  remarks 
This study has illustrated how macroeconomic shocks affect banks’ loan losses 
from the corporate sector by revisiting and extending the model of Sorge and 
Virolainen (2006). In the base model, the central macroeconomic factors that 
drive industry-specific default rates and hence loan losses are the output gap, the 
real interest rate and the corporate sector indebtedness. The empirical model for 
default rates is then used in simulating the aggregate loan loss distribution. 
  We have considered the following extensions to the base model and have 
studied their effect on the loan loss distribution. First, instead of aggregate output 
we considered industry-specific outputs; second, we relaxed the constant LGD 
assumption used in the simulations and make LGD depend on the output gap; and 
third, we considered alternative ways of specifying shocks to the explanatory 
macro variables. It turned out that in terms of the loan loss distribution; mainly the 
endogenized LGD had a material impact. We also showed that disaggregation 
significantly improves the properties, including stability properties, of the model 
but it does not have a significant quantitative impact on the loan loss simulation 
results. Moreover, the model with industry-specific outputs is useful when we 
consider the potential second-round effects on the aggregate loan loss risk of a 
single industrial cluster, particularly the ICT cluster which is quite central to the 
Finnish economy. We also considered the empirical fit of the model based 
expected loan losses with actual loan losses and found that although the 
endogenous LGD improves the fit, the model nevertheless falls short of 
explaining the large loan losses experienced in the early 1990’s crisis in Finland. 
Identifying the missing risk factors that could explain the gap remains an issue for 
future research. 
  We also emphasize that the severity of a crisis, in terms of mounting loan 
losses, may very much depend on the exact nature of the crisis. That is, the 
combination of simultaneous macroeconomic shocks as well as the duration of 
these shocks may be important. We have studied these issues with the help of 
scenario based analyses. We found that prolonged deep recessions as well as a 
combination of simultaneous shocks both seem to have a convex effect on loan 
losses. This suggests that policy actions should be designed in a way that prevents 
acceleration of a looming crisis. Finally, a comparison of the loan loss distribution 
on the eve of the 1990’s crisis with the most recent distribution demonstrated the 
greatly elevated risk level prior to the 1990’s crisis. More generally, the 
comparison emphasizes the effect of prevailing macroeconomic conditions on 
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